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Any number of problems about causation emerge when one puts 
Locke into contact with other philosophers such as Hume. But 
Locke’s real problem with causation is internal to his view. It is 
very simple: Chapter xxvi of Book II of the Essay is entitled ‘Of 
Cause and Effect, and other Relations’.
1
 Yet Locke has just 
finished explaining that relations are not real. So causation is not 
real.  
 The conclusion is intolerable. No commentator I know of 
denies that Locke takes causation to be a feature of the mind-
independent world.
2
 The first premise seems undeniable: while 
some contemporary authors deny that causation is a relation, 
Locke cannot be drafted into their ranks.
3
 The second premise, 
then, might be made to give way: perhaps, despite all the 
evidence to the contrary, Locke does not really mean it when he 
says that relations are ‘not contained in the real existence of 
Things’.
4
  
 I will not pursue that possibility, as I am among the majority of 
writers on the subject who take Locke at his word.
5
 All of us face 
 
 
1
 References to the Essay are to the edition of Peter H. Nidditch (1975), and in the 
following form: Book.chapter.section: page number.  
 
2
 As Angela Coventry (2003) notes, there is no shortage of commentators who think 
that Locke anticipates Hume’s claim that outer experience provides us with no idea of 
power. I find Coventry’s arguments to the contrary persuasive. But none of her 
interlocutors would deny that, for Locke, bodies in fact are causes. 
 
3
 See, e.g., Boris Hennig (2011). 
 
4
 Essay, II. xxv. 8: 322.  
 
5
 Among those who deny the extra-mental reality of relations are Jonathan Bennett 
(1971, 253–54), myself (2009, 159–69), and Matthew Stuart (2013, 24–32). Rae 
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what I am calling the real problem of causation because we agree 
that, in some important sense, Locke does not count relations 
among the furniture of the world. Rather than try to read away 
Locke’s anti-realism about relations, I want to see just how far we 
can go in making sense of such a sparsely populated ontology.  
  
§1. Relations 
For most of the history of philosophy, some version of anti-
realism about relations has been prominent, if not dominant. (It 
may still prevail today among those who take up the topic).
6
 This 
is hardly surprising. For consider how strange the world would 
look if relations were real. Alongside the array of individual 
objects and their intrinsic properties, we would have a nearly 
infinite panoply of n-adic tropes. There would be, for example, 
not just the set of actual human faces and their intrinsic 
properties, but … has more/fewer pores than …, … is 
lighter/darker than …, and so on, and enough of them to connect 
each face with all others. As Peter Auriol put it in the fourteenth 
century,  
 
if the face of whatever man is different from the faces of all [other] men, 
the man’s face will be burdened with innumerable realities, because he will 
have as many real dissimilitudes and differences of form in [his] face as in 
a subject as there are [other] men.
7
 
 
But it is not just ontological profligacy that bothers the 
nominalist. Locke claims that ‘Cajus, whom I consider to day as a 
Father, ceases to be so to morrow, only by the death of his Son, 
 
Langton 2000 argues for the reality of relations; see Stuart 2013 and my 2009 for 
objections to Langton’s view.  
 
6
 The best recent treatment of the ontology of relations is John Heil’s (2012), ch. 7. 
On Heil’s view, as on Locke’s (as I read him), there are non-relational truthmakers for 
relational truths.  
 
7
 Quoted in Mark Henninger (1989, 156). William of Ockham (1974, 162 and 174) 
gives a parallel argument, using relations of distance instead of similarity. 
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without any alteration made in himself’.
8
 And yet if relations 
were real, there would be a genuine change in Cajus. Locke’s 
contemporary, Robert Boyle, makes exactly the same point when 
he tells us that ‘[u]nless we admit the doctrine I have been 
proposing, we must admit that a body may have an almost infinite 
number of new real entities accruing to it without the intervention 
of any physical change in the body itself’.
9
 Both the parsimony 
and change arguments can be traced back at least through the 
medievals and, in the case of the change argument, to Aristotle 
himself.
10
 
 This background explains why Locke feels no need to trumpet 
his position on relations: he is simply giving us the default 
position. In an off-hand remark, Locke says that relations are ‘not 
contained in the real existence of Things, but something 
extraneous, and superinduced’.
11
 I have argued at excruciating 
length elsewhere that Locke means just what he seems to mean.
12
 
I won’t repeat those arguments here. And as I’ve mentioned, 
although it is far from uncontroversial, the majority of authors 
who have taken up Locke’s view of relations converge on some 
 
 
8
 Essay, II. xxv. 5: 321. 
 
9
 Boyle 1991/1666, 24. 
 
10
 Physics 5.2 225
b
10–13, in Aristotle 1984. There are any number of other 
problems waiting for the realist. Leibniz, for example, holds that it is incoherent to 
suppose that a single entity can have, as it were, one foot in one substance and one foot 
in another. See especially the Letter to Des Bosses of 29 May 1716 (1989, 202). And it 
is easy to generate awkward questions for the realist. Suppose a is to the left of b at t-1 
and at t we (almost) instantaneously swap c for a. What happened to the trope … to the 
left of…? Did it disappear, only to be replaced by a numerically distinct but otherwise 
indistinguishable trope? Or does it persist, with one flank unsaturated for an instant? In 
short, what are the persistence conditions for relations? I can’t see any way to answer 
such questions short of brute stipulation, which is usually a sign that we are dealing 
with something mind-dependent. 
 
11
 Essay, II. xxv. 8: 322. I say ‘off-hand’ because the main point Locke is making in 
the sentence is that one can sometimes grasp the idea of a relation more easily than that 
of the relata.  
 
12
 See my 2009 and (forthcoming.) 
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version of anti-realism. 
 The most stark anti-realist reading is staked out by Matthew 
Stuart.
13
 On his view, there are no relations, full stop. And there is 
no way to square Locke’s apparent commitment to relations such 
as powers with this denial. I think we can do a bit better.
14
 I have 
argued that Locke fits neatly into a tradition we might call 
‘foundational conceptualism’.
15
 On this view, a claim of the form 
‘aRb’ can be true even when there is no relation R out there in the 
world. What counts is whether the monadic features of a and b 
provide a ground or foundation for the application of the 
relational concept. 
 Foundational conceptualism is the best way of taking Locke’s 
words at face value. Locke tells us that ‘[t]he Nature therefore of 
Relation, consists in the referring, or comparing two things, one 
to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be 
denominated’.
16
 The comparison itself is a mental act. But 
whether the comparison is apt or not is a question of how things 
are in the world. Substances and monadic properties are the only 
truthmakers we need for propositions involving relations. 
Relations function in much the same way as concepts like the 
average taxpayer. There are perfectly mind-independent facts that 
serve as truthmakers for claims about the average taxpayer. And 
it would be perverse to assume that the average taxpayer itself 
(himself? herself?) is among them.  
 The best cases for the foundational conceptualist’s strategy are 
internal relations. By an ‘internal relation’, I mean a relation that 
 
 
13
 See his 2013, 24 n. 
 
14
 I develop and defend this view in my 2009, chs. 16 and 19. 
 
15
 One medieval representative of foundational conceptualism is Peter John Olivi 
(thirteenth century), as Robert Pasnau (2011) reports. Olivi writes, ‘[i]t does not seem 
that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for 
(dicit) another real aspect belonging to the same thing’ (trans. and quoted in Pasnau 
2011, 236). 
 
16
 Essay, II. xxv. 5: 321. 
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obtains, if and when it does, solely in virtue of the monadic 
properties of the relata. Even those who do not endorse 
foundational conceptualism full stop are happy to deploy it in 
such cases.
17
 Assuming that ‘… is larger than …’ is an internal 
relation, there is no call to posit an extra something, beyond the 
sizes of the relata, to ground ‘the table is larger than the soda 
can’. Similarity relations are also internal; that these two fire 
hydrants resemble each other in respect of shape does not require 
anything over and above the shape of the two hydrants. 
 Whether it is ultimately successful or not, the motivation for 
foundational conceptualism is simple: just as Locke says, such a 
view can at once allow us to affirm the truth of at least some 
propositions about relations while preventing the ontological 
explosion unrestrained realism threatens. Among the anti-realist 
readings on offer, it gives us the best chance of saving the 
appearances.  
 The initial problem of causation is that Locke’s anti-realism 
about relations threatens to infect causation. We can now replace 
that formulation with a sharper one: can we understand, if not 
accept, the claim that the truthmakers for propositions involving 
causation are nothing but substances and their monadic 
properties?  
 A word about the ground rules. First, I will count it as a 
success if I can show that Locke’s foundational conceptualism 
can account for causal relations. I am not promising here to 
account for spatial and temporal relations. Those cases are 
difficult but, at least where space is concerned, I’ve argued 
elsewhere that Locke does give us the raw materials for re-
constructing his view.
18
 In any case, I will help myself to spatial 
and temporal relations. As will soon become obvious, there are 
plenty of problems to deal with even after this concession is 
 
 
17
 For a contemporary use of what amounts to the foundational conceptualist’s 
strategy, deployed with regard to internal relations, see Armstrong 1980, 86–7. The 
same point is made by Auriol, as reported by Henninger (1987). 
 
18
 See esp. my (forthcoming). 
  
58 
made. I shall also be concerned almost exclusively with body-
body causation.  
 Second, it is important to be clear on what is to count as a 
monadic property. I will count as a monadic or intrinsic any 
property of an object a any property that owes its existence solely 
to a. Some of those properties will in fact characterize a only 
because of the relations among a’s parts. Texture is a case in 
point: the texture of a body is a function of how the different parts 
of its surface are arranged. What Locke needs to be able to do is 
to show how causation could be understood solely in terms of 
substances and their monadic properties in the technical sense I 
have just introduced. He will then need to go on to explain how 
texture is a function of the intrinsic properties of the parts that 
make up the body. But again, my focus here is on the prospects 
for a Lockean account of causation, not of spatial or other 
relations generally. 
 
§2. The ideas of cause and effect 
Historians of philosophy have not devoted many pages to Locke’s 
explicit treatment of cause and effect in his Essay. Hume’s direct 
attacks on Locke’s derivation of the idea of power have, 
understandably, focused attention on the early sections of II. xxi. 
The brief chapter (II. xxvi) has become all but invisible. 
 From the beginning, those who have discussed the chapter 
complain of its brevity and superficiality. John Sergeant, for 
example, writes that Locke ‘proceeds not to show us, (which yet 
he often does in other occasions) in what the nature of Causality 
consists, which is of the chiefest use in philosophy’.
19
 Even those 
much more sympathetic to Locke have been hard-pressed to find 
any merit in the chapter.
20
 The brevity of Locke’s account would 
be a virtue were it substantive and clear. Here again, there is near 
 
 
19
 Sergeant (1984/1697, 254). A few years later, Henry Lee complains that Locke 
has ‘omitted’ ‘the clear stating the Notions of Cause and Effect’ (1702, 118). 
 
20
 See e.g. R. I. Aaron (1937, 182 f.) and D. J. O’Connor (1967, 94). 
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unanimity among commentators: Locke’s discussion is 
‘unsatisfying’
21
 and ‘lacking in depth’.
22
  
 Michael Ayers is quite right to call it ‘hardly more than an 
appendix to the chapter on ideas of relations’.
23
 But causation is a 
species of relation, so it is fitting that a discussion of it should 
follow hard on the heels of a treatment of its genus. And the 
chapter’s brevity is also no surprise if, as I shall argue, Locke has 
something to say about the general nature of causation and little 
but speculation about the precise form it takes.  
 Here is Locke’s official derivation of our ideas of cause and 
effect: 
 
IN the notice, that our Senses take of the constant Vicissitude of Things, 
we cannot but observe, that several particular, both Qualities, and 
Substances begin to exist; and that they receive this their Existence, from 
the due Application and Operation of some other Being. From this 
Observation, we get our Ideas of Cause and Effect. That which produces 
any simple or complex Idea, we denote by the general Name Cause; and 
that which is produced, Effect.
24
 
 
The last quoted sentence is puzzling, since it suggests that the 
only things that merit the name ‘effects’ are ideas. What follows 
shows that that cannot be what Locke means. Locke speaks of 
‘the simple Idea of Heat’ as the cause of fluidity in wax. But 
unless he means to endorse telekinesis, he must be equivocating 
on ‘idea,’ as II. viii. 8 warns us he will. Sometimes ‘idea’ means 
idea; sometimes it means quality.  
 The second section of II. xxvi, and the last to be concerned 
with causation, proceeds to sub-divide the general notion of a 
cause into three categories: creation ex nihilo, the generation or 
 
 
21
 Ayers 1991, i, 163.  
 
22
 Coventry 2003, 96. 
 
23
 Ayers 1991, i, 163. 
 
24
 Essay, II. xxvi. 1: 324. 
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making of a new substance by the re-arrangement of already 
existing particles, and the alteration of an existing substance such 
that it takes on a new quality. And that is the whole of Locke’s 
explicit treatment of the ideas of cause and effect. A cause is a 
producer, whether of a new quality, mode, or substance. 
Sometimes qualities cause other qualities (as when heat causes 
fluidity); sometimes the application of one substance to another 
changes a substance into a new one, as when fire changes wood 
to ashes. 
 One question raised, but not answered, by the chapter is this: 
what is the connection between powers and causes? A quick 
comparison of II. xxi. 1 and II. xxvi. 1 reveals that the passages 
are nearly identical: the ideas of both power and cause arise when 
the mind perceives change. Nothing in II. xxvi, however, 
corresponds to II. xxi. 4’s claim about the introspective origin of 
our idea of active power. There is no active/passive distinction to 
be drawn with regard to causes. Perhaps for this reason, Locke’s 
examples in the later chapter are all examples of changes in the 
extra-mental world. 
 The precise relation between power and cause is made clear in 
Draft B.
25
 Despite our ordinary ways of speaking, powers are 
relations, not one-place properties.
26
 While Boyle uses the more 
respectable example of locks and keys, Locke chooses the 
purgative power of rhubarb as one of his illustrations. On the side 
of the rhubarb itself, the ability to purge is grounded in its own 
micro-structure. Whether it counts as a purgative or not depends 
on whether there are any life forms around with the proper 
digestive tracts. ‘[T]he purgeing power in Rhubarb is relative for 
rhubarb would still be the same were there noe animal in the 
 
 
25
 It is worth noting that, while Locke discusses power and then cause in the Essay, 
with many unrelated chapters in between, Draft B canvasses the three ‘Grand relations’ 
of ‘Time place & causality’ (1990, 260), and only then discusses power. 
 
26
 Locke says ‘Powers are Relations’ (II. xxi. 19: 243). The powers of gold are 
‘nothing else, but so many relations’ (II. xxiii. 37: 317); most of the simple ideas that 
make up our ideas of substances are powers, ‘which [are] Relations to other 
Substances’ (II. xxxi. 8: 381; see II. xxi. 73: 286–87). 
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world capable of being purged’.
27
 The state of the rhubarb, 
whatever it is, that flanks the power relation is an enduring and 
presumably not very mysterious one. The power comes and goes 
depending on whether a partner is available to occupy the other 
side of the relation. Just as foundational conceptualism requires, 
whether something has a given power turns solely on the monadic 
properties of the objects involved.   
 When a substance with the relevant enduring state comes into 
contact with other suitably arranged substances, the power 
becomes active. ‘The substances where in these powers are when 
they exert them come under an other relation & are called 
causes’.
28
 In the Essay, Locke will make it more clear that 
qualities as well as substances can be causes. But this seems 
largely terminological: it’s as natural to call rhubarb the cause of 
the purging as it is to take the cause to be whatever quality about 
the rhubarb explains the purging. In fact, the Essay is even more 
generous with the title ‘cause’: ‘whatever is considered by us, to 
conduce or operate, to the producing any particular simple Idea, 
or Collection of simple Ideas, whether Substance, or Mode, 
which did not before exist, hath thereby in our Minds the relation 
of a Cause, and so is denominated by us’.
29
 So anything relevant 
to the production of a new quality or substance deserves to be 
called a ‘cause’. Locke shows little interest in the project of 
isolating causes from background conditions.          
 How can causation be an internal relation? Let us work 
through one of Locke’s examples. Take a case where heat, or if 
you prefer the object that is hot, causes wax to become fluid. 
What is the truthmaker for ‘the heat caused the wax to become 
fluid’? Just this: when heat was applied, the wax lost one quality 
 
 
27
 Locke 1990, 262. 
 
28
 Locke 1990, 262. 
 
29
 Essay, II. xxvi. 1: 324. The evidence for my point rests on ‘conduce’ having 
roughly the same meaning it does today. Pierre Coste supports this assumption by 
rendering the word as ‘contribuant’. 
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and gained another.
30
 So far I have ignored the spatial and 
temporal relations that must be among the truthmakers for causal 
claims. Locke’s account implies that a cause exists before its 
effect, since the essence of causation is the production of 
something new, whether substance or quality. And Locke’s claim 
that we get our ideas of cause and effect from witnessing ‘the due 
Application and Operation’ of one being on another suggests that 
cause and effect must be contiguous. Later on, we will deal with 
action at a distance. But throughout the early drafts and first 
edition of the Essay, Locke is convinced that bodies cannot act a 
distance. So we can plausibly read Locke as building spatial 
contiguity and temporal precedence into his concept of causation, 
at least in his early stages. Obviously I have done nothing to show 
how spatial and temporal claims could be made true by monadic 
properties of bodies. But for now I would remind the reader that I 
have tabled spatial and temporal relations.
31
 With that caveat, we 
can say that we have just what the foundational conceptualist 
requires: a story told using only the intrinsic properties of the 
causal relata.  
 Matthew Stuart has pressed an objection that might seem 
particularly compelling in this context.
32
 If relations are mind-
dependent, then aRb cannot be true unless there is some mind 
around to think it. This is bad enough in general but seems 
 
 
30
 It is worth noting just how closely Locke anticipates some contemporary 
philosophers who endorse a powers view. As Stephen Mumford puts it, if the powers 
view is right, ‘the causal relation would not even be an external one. The existence of 
the causal relata, the power and its manifestation, is enough alone to ensure that the 
causal relation exists’ (2009, 276).  
 
31
 Someone might argue that if we cannot arrive at a plausible understanding of 
spatiotemporal relations on the anti-realist view, we should do whatever is necessary to 
make Locke into a realist. In my view, this is to allow charity to distort the past. The 
historian’s job cannot be to make every philosopher come out with a clear and 
consistent position that is also, to us, plausible. Consider what future historians, 
operating on those principles, would make of the discipline’s recent past. Give it two 
hundred years and someone will argue that David Lewis never really held modal 
realism. 
 
32
 Stuart 2013, 29–30. 
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especially implausible in the case of causation: can it really not be 
the case that heat causes the wax to become fluid unless someone 
compares these qualities in respect of causation? 
 Locke has an answer to this objection. Consider his definition 
of truth:  
 
Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify 
nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by 
them, do agree or disagree with one another.
33
 
 
There is nothing special about propositions involving causation: 
no proposition is true unless there is a mind there to think it. 
Propositions, whether mental or verbal, are mind-dependent. 
Locke’s metaphysics simply has no room for a Platonic heaven 
where propositions can dwell in splendid isolation.  
 Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the truthmakers for 
causal propositions are mind-independent. Whether a mind 
compares any particular heat trope with a neighboring fluidity 
trope or not, those tropes will be there. Locke’s nominalism 
sweeps aside mind-independent universals and propositions alike. 
But what really has been lost? The world is as it is regardless of 
how it is thought of. 
 There are important limitations on the account of causation we 
have unearthed. Even if Locke’s ideas of cause and effect meet 
the strictures set out in his prior chapter on relations, they capture 
only the most superficial elements of causation in the natural 
world. When we think of things as causes, we ‘consider any 
simple Idea, or Substance, as beginning to exist, by the Operation 
of some other, without knowing the manner of that Operation’.
34
 
Although Locke does not do so, it is helpful to think of his work 
as unfolding different concepts of causation, each suited to a 
different layer of reality. What we might call the ‘surface’ 
concept of cause and effect is so thin as to be a kind of dummy 
 
 
33
 Essay, IV. v. 2: 574. 
 
34
 Essay, II. xxvi. 2: 325. 
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concept, a stand-in for something only God-like perception could 
teach us. 
 The surface concept’s limitations also have epistemic 
consequences. Not having any inkling of the ‘manner of 
operation’ means that, as Locke puts it in Draft B, ‘[w]hen we see 
anything we doe not know that it will either produce such an 
effect as that thing or that kinde hath producd at an other time’.
35
 
Our grounds for making such predictions fall short of knowledge. 
The only thing that blocks Humean scepticism about induction is 
the fact that there is a deeper story to be told about causation and 
the structure of the physical world in which it occurs. 
Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about that deeper story.
36
  
 
§3. The initial deep concept 
One thing that makes reading Locke challenging is his tendency 
to shift from the psychological project of describing the origin 
and contents of ideas to metaphysics and physics. The surface 
concept of cause and effect is plainly an episode in the 
psychological project. When it comes to figuring out just whether 
and how that concept might apply at the deep level, Locke runs 
into two problems. 
 First and most obviously, the deep level is deep precisely 
because it is not available to experience. Whatever is responsible 
for the macro-level interactions we observe must be taking place 
at the micro-level. That does not prevent Locke from telling us 
what kind of thing must be happening at the micro-level. There 
are metaphysical constraints that can show us the outline of the 
causal process, if not its details. Second, Locke’s early, firm 
belief that bodies interact only through impulse is challenged by 
Newton. In the end, Locke changes his mind and revises some 
passages of the Essay accordingly. The easiest way to approach 
 
 
35
 ‘nor doe we know that what we see was the effect of such a cause farther than 
our senses’ (1990, 97). Locke makes the same point at IV. iii. 14: 546. 
 
36
 This is what leads Ayers to call Locke’s concepts of cause and power ‘dummy 
concepts’; see esp. his 1991, i, 163–65. 
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this material is to begin with Locke’s early view and bracket the 
whole question of gravitation for the moment.  
 We know already that Locke’s initial deeper concept must 
conform to his theory of relations. It differs from the surface 
concept in that it includes an outline of the modus operandi (as 
Locke refers to it in his drafts) of the causal relation. But there are 
other differences as well. Above, we saw that Locke takes our 
concept of cause to apply to anything that is relevant to the 
production of a new substance or quality. In fact, there is good 
reason to think that, on Locke’s view, there will almost never be a 
case in which the causal relation is one-one. Locke makes the 
point explicitly with regard to powers: 
 
[T]he great Parts and Wheels, as I may say so, of this stupendous Structure 
of the Universe, may, for ought we know, have such a connexion and 
dependence in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that, 
perhaps, Things in this our Mansion, would put on quite another face, and 
cease to be what they are, if some one of the Stars, or great Bodies 
incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be, or move as it does. 
This is certain, Things, however absolute and entire they seem in 
themselves, are but Retainers to other parts of Nature.
37
  
 
So in our search for the grounds of the causal relation, we are not 
confined to the monadic properties of one substance or quality 
(the cause) and another (the effect). Our idea of cause, which 
typically allows us to think in such one-to-one terms, is adapted 
to the surface of things, not their depths. But that is not to say that 
nothing resembling that concept is applicable at the ground floor. 
Causation will still be a matter of production and it will still be 
subject to the strictures of any relation, namely, it has to be 
grounded in the monadic properties of bodies.  
 We can learn more about the initial deep concept of cause by 
asking after Locke’s vision of science under epistemically ideal 
conditions. This is speculation, obviously, but it is speculation in 
which Locke happily indulges:  
 
 
37
 Essay, IV. vi. 11: 587.  
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[I]f we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute 
Constituent parts of any two Bodies, we should know without Trial several 
of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a 
Square, or Triangle…The dissolving of Silver in aqua fortis, and Gold in 
aqua Regia, and not vice versa, would be, then, perhaps, no more difficult 
to know, than it is to a Smith to understand, why the turning of one Key 
will open a Lock, and not the turning of another.
38
 
 
Under these idealized conditions, any air of mystery about the 
natural world would evaporate. Given knowledge of the minute 
parts of bodies, we would be able to infer their behavior and 
macro-level properties. As Locke puts it, to know the properties 
of gold, ‘it would be no more necessary, that Gold should exist, 
and that we should make Experiments upon it, than it is necessary 
for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle 
should exist in any Matter’.
39
 
 There are many questions to be asked about Locke’s view on 
these issues, and others have asked and answered them well.
40
 
Our interest lies in what it can tell us about causation. First, it is 
hardly an accident that Locke uses the analogy of geometry: an 
idealized science would be no different in kind from geometry. 
The perspicuity of geometrical demonstrations is the model and 
(perhaps unrealizable) goal for natural science.  
 We can capitalize on Locke’s appeal to geometry by taking it 
as a clue to the kinds of relata that will justify the application of 
the ideas of cause and effect. And here it is vital that the 
connections detected by geometers are necessary connections that 
cannot be reduced to analytic truths.
41
 Locke claims that 
 
 
38
 Essay, IV. iii. 25: 556. 
 
39
 Essay, IV. vi. 11: 585. 
 
40
 See esp. Downing 2007. 
 
41
 As Kant points out in the Prolegomena, Locke’s treatment of geometry 
anticipates, in important respects, Kant’s own notion of the synthetic a priori. For more 
on this connection, see Ayers 1991, i, 101. 
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[W]e can know the Truth, and so may be certain in Propositions, which 
affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its 
precise complex Idea, but not contained in it. As that the external Angle of 
all Triangles, is bigger than either of the opposite internal Angles; which 
relations of the outward Angle, to either of the opposite internal Angles, 
making no part of the complex Idea, signified by the name Triangle, this is 
a real Truth, and conveys with it instructive real Knowledge.
42
  
 
This same kind of non-analytic but necessary truth would be 
captured by the claims of an ideal natural science. These 
epistemic points are well known; their metaphysical implications 
are not. Note how Locke’s example above works. The relation 
captured by the proposition in question is nothing but a 
comparison. But the things being compared are such as to make 
the resulting proposition necessarily true. In short, the relations in 
question are internal relations, the very kind foundational 
conceptualism handles with ease. 
 Let us step back and see how Locke’s theory of relations fits 
with his theory of cause and effect. We know that any claim of 
the form ‘aRb’ has to be true in virtue of monadic properties. 
Now, as we have seen, a completed Lockean science would 
reveal that there are many more substances involved in any event 
than just a single cause and a single effect, a and b. But for 
simplicity’s sake, we can take ‘a’ and ‘b’ as referring to whatever 
monadic properties of whatever substances are relevant. Locke’s 
epistemic claim is that if you knew everything there is to know 
about a, you would be able to predict b. The ontological side of 
this is that there is nothing more to a’s causing than b than the 
monadic properties of a and b.  
 These points suggest a second line of argument to my 
conclusion about Locke’s picture of cause and effect. Above, I 
argued from Locke’s theory of relations to the conclusion that 
there can be nothing more to any given causal transaction beyond 
the monadic properties of the substances involved. But Locke’s 
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 Essay, IV. viii. 8: 614.  
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idealized picture of a completed science provides a second 
argument to this same conclusion. For if there were something 
else in play, knowledge of the monadic properties of all the 
relevant bodies revealed by microscopic investigation would not 
allow us to know that silver will dissolve in aqua fortis. To know 
that, you would have to know the mysterious ‘something else.’ 
But Locke believes there would be nothing more to know. And to 
believe that, he has to believe that causal claims are true solely in 
virtue of the monadic properties of the relata. 
 That still leaves the problem of motion, of course. How could 
a’s moving from place p to place q be a matter of a’s intrinsic 
properties? It can’t be. Although as we’ll see Locke at times treats 
motion as an intrinsic property of a body, I doubt that that is his 
real view.
43
 Although motion is indefinable, Locke agrees with 
‘the Atomists’ who call motion ‘a passage’ from one place to 
another.
44
 So motion is going to be a relation. What, then, are its 
truthmakers? If we can help ourselves to spatiotemporal relations, 
then the answer is easy: that a exists in p at t and in q at t’ is 
enough to make it the case that a moves from p to q in t-t’. And 
although temporal relations remain, as far as I can tell, deeply 
problematic for Locke, the account of space he considers in Book 
IV would make spatial relations properties of objects and not 
relations at all.
45
  
 The initial deep concept of causation, then, shares some 
features with its more superficial cousin. Both are constrained by 
Locke’s rejection of relations. That means that the truthmakers 
for causal claims must ultimately turn out to be nothing but the 
 
 
43
 Note that Locke thinks that our idea of motion is a simple idea, which seems to 
bar it from being a relation. Ideas of relations are always complex, including at least 
two constituent ideas and an act of comparison. Nevertheless, Locke’s criteria for 
simplicity where ideas are concerned are notoriously slippery.  
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 Essay, III. iv. 9: 423. Locke’s only complaint is that the atomists have not given a 
definition of motion; they have merely used new words for the same idea. 
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 Essay, IV. x. 18: 628. For discussion, see Bennett and Remnant 1978, Downing 
2014, my (forthcoming), and below. 
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monadic properties (in the technical sense I specified) of the 
bodies involved. But this deeper concept is nevertheless only 
provisional, and that for two reasons. First, the initial deep 
concept still requires spatial contiguity, a requirement Locke 
drops after becoming acquainted with Newton’s works. Second, 
the initial concept does not adequately account for impulse. In the 
next section, I argue that these two issues are intimately related 
and lead Locke toward yet a third concept of causation.  
 
§4. Problems for the initial deep concept 
Any account of the modus operandi of bodily causes, even in the 
barest terms, needs some story about what Locke calls ‘impulse’: 
the collision of one body into another. In such cases, the struck 
body gains as much motion as is lost by the striking body. The 
only conception we have of such a transaction is ‘the passing of 
Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure 
and unconceivable’ as how minds move bodies.
46
 This is a 
curious predicament. The only way we can think of bodies as 
acting is by impulse (a claim Locke never backs down from). But 
the only way we can conceive impulse is itself ‘unconceivable’. It 
is not immediately obvious why the transfer of motion should be 
inconceivable. But recall that Locke began that chapter of the 
Essay by telling us that we are constrained to think of simple 
qualities as subsisting in some substratum and not flitting about 
on their own. If some determinate motion were to ‘jump ship’ 
into another substance, it would violate this principle. Note, too, 
that the transfer model requires us to think of motion as a 
monadic property of the moving body. The two notions stand or 
fall together.  
 In my view, the most sensible course is to take both the 
transfer model of impulse and the monadic treatment of motion as 
placeholders for whatever the real story about impulse at the 
micro-level turns out to be. It might be the best Locke can do at 
the moment, but that is because the concept of impulse reflects 
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 Essay, II. xxiii. 28: 311; cf. my 2009, 179 n. and Stuart 2013, 102. 
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the behavior and qualities of bodies at the macro level. Now, 
someone might argue that Locke’s problem with impulse is a 
conceptual one. And so it is. But again, our concept is itself 
acquired through experience. Fuller experience—experience of 
qualities at the micro-level—would, Locke thinks, supply us with 
a concept of impulse that does not violate the rest of his 
metaphysical views. 
 And there is good, independent reason to believe that for 
Locke the true qualities of matter at the micro-level are not just 
tiny versions of the primary qualities we perceive at the macro-
level but include some utterly new ones that we cannot now 
conceive. Famously, Locke writes to Stillingfleet,  
 
It is true, I say [in the Essay] ‘that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing 
else’. And so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of 
their operation. But I am since convinced by the judicious Mr. Newton’s 
incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God’s power, 
in this point, by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards 
matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God 
can, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above 
what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained what we 
know of matter, but also an unquestionable and every where visible 
instance, that he has done so.
47
 
 
Locke alters II. viii. 11, the source of his quotation, which now 
claims that bodies act by ‘impulse, the only way which we can 
conceive Bodies operate in’.
48
 Locke does not change his mind 
about our conceptual resources. We are still constrained to think 
of bodies as acting by impulse and, presumably, of impulse as 
transfer. What has changed is the relation between what is 
conceivable and what is possible.  
 But it is not as if this inconceivable way of operating is totally 
closed off to us. Just as my reading predicts, Locke’s theory of 
relations constrains the range of possibilities he considers. Note 
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how Locke puts it: God has put into bodies powers that go 
beyond anything we can derive from our idea of body. It is not 
that God has decreed laws of nature that force bodies to behave 
thus and so. If that were the case, we need not be ignorant of any 
of the monadic properties of bodies, since the laws would swing 
free of all such properties. It would be our idea of God, or of 
God’s laws, that would be at fault. Instead, what Locke is now 
convinced of is that our idea of body is inadequate, since bodies 
have powers that cannot be read off of the ideas we have of 
them.
49
   
 These last points help shed some light on the problem of 
impulse. What Newton shows Locke is that bodies have 
properties that are not on his list of primary qualities. All along, 
Locke thinks there is something mysterious about impulse. So 
when he reads Newton, he is already convinced of our epistemic 
limitations when it comes to explaining how bodies operate. The 
problems of impulse and gravity are both shortcomings of our 
ideas of body and both reflect the same defect: there are qualities 
in bodies of which we have no idea. Lacking the relevant 
experience means lacking the requisite ideas, which means 
lacking the ability to conceive of what is really happening on the 
ground floor. Locke might not be a mysterian in philosophy of 
mind, but he is one in philosophy of body.  
 There is another way to put my point. We know already that 
there must be a foundation for the causal relation among all the 
relevant substances. That foundation will be the monadic 
properties of those substances. The problem is that we don’t 
know what monadic properties might be lurking down there, 
although we do know that there are at least some we don’t know 
anything about. If we could experience these hidden properties, 
we would stand in the same epistemic position to those bodies 
that the locksmith occupies with regard to his locks and keys. 
 Let me close this section with a quick recapitulation. We begin 
with the surface concept of cause and effect. This concept is fine 
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as far as it goes. But it includes nothing at all about way in which 
one body or quality brings about a change in the other. In the 
absence of a God-like vision into the micro-structural features of 
bodies, we will never have a full grasp of that modus operandi. 
But we can make some progress, by asking what kind of thing 
must be going on at that level. Using the concepts we have 
formed of macro-level objects, we construct the initial deep 
concept of causation. According to this notion, bodies act by 
impulse, fitting together as lock and key. Even if we cannot fully 
grasp impulse itself, impulse must be involved and provides a 
degree of intelligibility. The real problem with the initial deep 
concept is that bodies can act in ways other than impulse. (I see 
no reason to think that Locke’s reading of Newton leads him to 
deny that bodies act by impulse, only that they act in no other 
way.) 
 We finally arrive at a more ecumenical, but correspondingly 
less substantive, deep concept of causation. All that is left, really, 
is the structure: whatever causal claims are ultimately true, their 
truthmakers will be nothing but the monadic properties of the 
bodies involved. And given gravitation, that might well be all the 
bodies that there are. We found several ways in which all three 
concepts differ from each other, but let me point here to a new 
one. The initial concept required spatial propinquity and temporal 
precedence. The final concept jettisons both of these: by 
definition, action at a distance violates propinquity. Just as 
obviously, if body a affects b by gravitation, there is no reason to 
require that a precedes b in time.  
 The ultimate truth about causation cannot be fully grasped with 
our current, impoverished rank of ideas. Locke thinks that such a 
grasp would require us to revise our surface idea of causation in 
at least the ways I’ve suggested. In a different context, Locke 
speculates that ‘if we would emancipate our selves from vulgar 
Notions, and raise our Thoughts, as far as they would reach’, we 
might come to understand how God first made matter.
50
 Pierre 
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Coste tells us that Locke has in mind Newton’s suggestion that 
bodies are nothing but ‘thickenings’ of space. Bodies, on this 
view, are just regions of space that God makes impenetrable. 
Such a view would of course make spatial relations internal. It 
would also overturn the everyday ontology of substances and 
qualities Locke works with. Achieving a complete understanding 
of the causal structure of the world, if it were possible, would 
equally require us to ‘emancipate our selves from vulgar 
Notions’. 
 
§5. Conclusion 
To sum up: the real problem of causation is that causation is a 
relation, and relations have no mind-independent existence. I 
argued that Locke’s view of relations allows for the mind-
independent existence of the monadic features of things that make 
it appropriate to compare them in some ways and not others. This 
is the point of foundational conceptualism, a nominalist view 
with which Locke and his reader would have been intimately 
familiar. Foundational conceptualism works best as an analysis 
(or dissolution) of internal relations, relations that obtain solely in 
virtue of the monadic properties of their relata. The first problem 
of causation, then, boils down to the problem of understanding 
how causal relations could be internal. I then argued that Locke’s 
ideas of cause and effect meet this requirement. And quite 
independently of his theory of relations, Locke’s vision of a 
perfected science entails that causal relations are internal. For 
Locke, the world as it is in itself is fully intelligible, if only we 
could know it. And that intelligibility requires that there be 
nothing more to a causal transaction over and above the monadic 
properties of the things being compared under the relation of 
cause and effect. 
 No doubt the influence of Hume has partly been to blame for 
obscuring this whole issue. Like most writers who come after 
him, Hume focuses on the idea of power and says next to nothing 
about Locke’s ideas of cause and effect. The real problem, 
internal to Locke’s own view, has become all but invisible. 
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Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the temptation to put Locke in 
dialogue with Hume. 
In fact, someone might well argue that my account foists an 
objectionably Humean view onto Locke. After all, if there is no 
mind-independent causation, since causation is a relation, then 
Hume and Locke agree. For the realist’s fantasy of Causation 
with a capital ‘C,’ Hume substitutes constant conjunction plus the 
determination of the mind to move from a thought of one object 
to another.
51
 How different is this picture from Locke’s, in the 
end? 
 In one way, the objection is illuminating. Like Hume, Locke 
has no place for a mysterious, irreducible ‘power’ or ‘cause’ 
lurking in the nature of things. Whatever the ultimate scientific 
story turns out to be, Locke is convinced it will conform to the 
outlines of his view. And that view allows only for substances 
and their monadic properties. 
 In another way, the objection misses the force of Locke’s 
foundational conceptualism. For Locke, it is still the case that 
objects in the world are such as to make their comparison under 
the concept of cause and effect appropriate. The truthmakers for 
causal claims are fully mind-independent. And when we 
recognize the necessity that characterizes geometrical claims, we 
can see a further difference with Hume. For Locke, the monadic 
properties of bodies are such that they ‘fit,’ like lock and key. 
These properties demand that nature take the course that it does. 
 Hume rejects mind-independent necessity and with it the kind 
of synthetic necessity Locke thinks such ‘fitting’ provides. But 
this is only one dimension of their debate. For Hume, ‘[s]olidity, 
extension, motion; these qualities are all compleat in themselves, 
and never point out any other event which may result from 
them’.
52
 So far, as we’ve seen, Locke might agree: we cannot use 
the macro-level qualities experience affords us to predict without 
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fail what will happen next. Locke disavows Hume’s assumption 
that these are the only kind of qualities that might ‘point out’ 
future events. For Locke, gravity shows that there must be 
qualities of which we have no direct conception operating at the 
micro level. Although we cannot detect any but the most trivial of 
‘necessary connexions’ among observable qualities, that there are 
other qualities that are necessarily connected at the micro level is 
beyond doubt.
53
 And that necessary connexion is neither a 
scholastic vis nor a mental projection. Instead, it is a thoroughly 
pedestrian internal relation which, in the end, obtains solely in 
virtue of the monadic properties of the bodies concerned.
54
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